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Abstract
This study explores the relationship between political parties’ availability of resources,
and the usage of different types of clientelistic exchanges as a vote-maximizing strategy,
given the institutional and structural factors that that facilitate or limit a party’s ability
to use its resources as clientelistic goods and services. The recent years have been
marked by a global trend of states introducing public funding to political parties, as well
as an increasing oversight of their resources, which has notably affected their resource
structure. Motivated by this trend, this research project includes political parties’ finances
as a resource available to them to pursue vote-maximizing strategies next to bureaucratic
control, a resource traditionally analyzed in studies of clientelism. Using multilevel
modeling on data from 88 countries and 506 parties, this study finds that while structural
factors have a consistent effect on the likelihood of political parties to engage in clientelistic
behaviors, institutional factors have a limited, but yet an important one. In particular, legal
restrictions have little power when it comes to preventing political parties from using their
control of the bureaucracy for clientelistic goals. However, the provision of state subsidies,
coupled with legal obligations for financial transparency and a threat of sanctions does
make political parties less likely to use their financial resources in clientelistic exchanges.
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Introduction
Resource availability is a necessary condition for political parties to engage in clientelistic
exchanges. In particular, in order for political parties to obtain electoral support on the basis
of quid pro quo exchanges, they have to dispose with material and non-material goods that
they could potentially offer to citizens in exchange for their votes. These goods can be of
differing nature and value: government contracts, preferential access to social benefits, selective
enforcement of regulatory rules, public sector employment, and even small amounts of cash or
gifts. The characteristics of the actor that political parties are trying to establish a clientelistic
relationship with, as well as the environment in which the actor is situated will influence the
likelihood of forming such a relation, as well as the type of goods political parties are likely to
offer. Specifically, political parties might offer small gifts or cash to relatively poor individual
citizens, while offering government contracts to business owners as a strategy to secure votes.
Besides structural factors, political parties’ usage of their resources can also be constrained by
institutional factors. In the presence of strong independent oversight of the party’s finances, or
severe sanctions for misuse of public resources, political parties might be reluctant to use the
resources at their disposal in clientelistic exchanges, and opt to invest them in developing and
pursuing their programmatic goals.
In this research project, I approach the problem of clientelism from the perspective of
resources, and political parties’ ability to use them in clientelistic exchanges. Being a necessary
condition for any clientelistic exchange to occur, they represent an ideal starting point for
the analysis of clientelism. Therefore, I seek to understand the relationship between political
parties’ availability of financial and non-financial resources and their usage in different types
of clientelistic exchanges, given the presence of institutional and structural constraints.
RQ: How does the availability of financial and non-financial resources, as well as the
institutional and structural constrains on their usage, affect political parties’ resort to
clientelistic vote-maximizing strategies?
The recent trend of increasing political finance regulation and introduction of public party
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funding schemes in a number of countries makes the study of the relationship between
resources and clientelistic vote-maximizing strategies more important than ever. These
measures have potentially reshaped the pool of resources that political parties have at their
disposal, as well as imposed restrictions on the scope of activities they can be used in.
In particular, while public funding schemes have introduced new revenues to parties’ bank
accounts, to the extent that the state has become the most important financial source for
political parties in a number of countries, financial transparency requirements, and stricter
penalties for financial manipulations and abuse of public resources have imposed potential
limitations on parties to freely dispose with their available resources. These changes in the
structure of political parties’ available resources provide conditions for reconsideration of the
parties’ vote-maximizing strategies. In light of this, the inclusion of party finances, and political
funding regulations, in the study of clientelism seems a necessary step in order to account for
the recent developments on the side of party resources.
The argument put forward in this study is that the likelihood of political parties to engage in
specific types of clientelistic exchanges will depend on the party’s availability of financial and
non-financial resources that could be used as goods and services in clientelistic transactions, as
well as the institutional and structural factors in place that could facilitate or limit the possibility
for creating and maintaining such clientelistic relationships. In particular, I argue that control
over the bureaucracy, as a central non-financial resource, is a necessary condition for engaging
in clientelistic exchanges involving the provision of preferential access to public benefits,
employment opportunities, government contracts, as well as biased application of regulatory
rules. In order for parties to control the working of the bureaucracy, and thus have the effective
opportunities to offer these clientelistic goods and services, will depend on the politicization
of the bureaucracy, as well as the present and past incumbency of the party in question. This
argument is supported by the findings of the empirical analysis, since incumbent parties, as
well as parties with a long history of incumbency are found to be much more likely to resort
to these clientelistic vote-maximizing strategies in conditions of bureaucratic politicization. I
also posit that the explicit legal ban on using these resources for narrow partisan goals would
decrease the likelihood of parties engaging in these types of clientelistic exchanges, however,
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the empirical analysis did not provide enough evidence to support this argument.
With regards to financial resources, I argue that the source, amount, and control of the
financial resources would strongly affect the likelihood of parties’ decision to offer gifts and
cash to citizens as an inducement for their votes. Specifically, I argue that the larger the
proportion of parties’ revenues originating from state subsidies, as well as the larger the real
value of the received subsidies, the less likely will parties be to use their finances as a resource
in clientelistic transactions. The rationale behind this is that state subsidies provide parties
with greater independence from society, as well as with more incentives and opportunities to
develop and promote their programmatic goals, with which they could potentially attract more
voters than with particularistic exchanges. The negative effects of public funding on political
parties’ resort to clientelistic vote-maximizing strategies are expected to be further reinforced
with the presence of financial oversight, and sanctions for uncovered financial manipulations.
The results from the empirical analysis provide some support for this argument. In particular,
while the proportion of the party’s revenue originating from state subsidies, as well as the value
of the subsidies are found to be negatively related to the parties’ likelihood to use gift-giving
as a clientelistic vote-maximizing strategy, these results fail to achieve statistical significance.
However, the legal obligation for regular reporting on party finances, as well as the combination
of state subsidies with legal obligation for public disclosure of financial information, and
with the threat of sanctions, are all found to be negatively related to clientelistic efforts, and
statistically significant.
The likelihood of all types of clientelistic exchanges to occur is also strongly influenced
by the economic development of the country, as well as by the ”clientelistic tradition”. In
particular, the lower the economical development of the country, the lower the ”price” of the
individual voter, and thus, the easier it is for political parties to buy it. In addition, the reliance
of political parties on clientelistic vote-maximizing strategies in the past is likely to continue in
the present, as they have the tendency to become entrenched in the political and social system.
Both of these expectations are empirically supported by the conducted analysis.
This research project is innovative in several respects. In particular, it accounts for the
effect of political funding on clientelism, a factor that has been systematically neglected in
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the clientelism literature. To this goal, original data was collected regarding the finances of
266 political parties from 47 countries, for a period of three years. In addition, the different
types of exchanges that fall into the scope of clientelism are also taken in consideration in this
project’s analysis. Thus, this study offers insights on the likelihood of political parties to engage
in specific types of clientelistic exchanges given a particular set of resources at their disposal.
Finally, this research project tests a number of hypotheses using large-N cross-country analysis,
covering 506 political parties from 88 countries, which stands in contrast to the overwhelming
majority of single and comparative case study analysis in the field of clientelism (Muno 2010:
12; Hicken 2011: 304). Moreover, it uses an expert survey, and thus a direct measure of
clientelism, and therefore distinguishes itself from the small body of large-N analysis in this
field that primarily rely on proxy measures of this phenomenon (Hicken 2011: 304).
The remainder of this paper is structured in five sections. In the following section I provide a
brief overview of the state of the art literature on clientelism, while in the next one I present my
framework for analysis. This is followed by a section describing the data used in the analysis,
as well as the methods employed. Finally, the last two sections present the findings of the
analysis, their discussion, and a conclusion.
State of the art literature on clientelism
The scientific study of clientelism has been characterized by three waves of research
(Roniger 2004; Stokes 2007; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007b). These three waves differ in their
scope, mode of analysis, as well as the disciplines they most closely relate to (Stokes 2007:
608). The first wave of research on clientelism has been primarily conducted in the 1970s,
in the realm of anthropology and sociology (Stokes 2007: 608). Most of the studies from
this period are single-case investigations, whose focus is on describing and conceptualizing
the phenomenon at hand (see Weingrod 1968; Paine 1971; Graziano 1976; Gellner et al.
1977; Schmidt et al. 1977; Eisenstadt and Lemarchand 1981). The scholars of this first
wave of research presented the phenomenon of clientelism as characteristic of traditional and
non-democratic societies, and predicted that it will gradually disappear as democratization
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and economic development processes unfold. A good example of this theoretical reasoning
is Scott’s study on the demise of machine politics and securing electoral support through the
provision of particularistic benefits in the urban areas of the United States. He argues that
socio-economic development has been the major cause for the transformation of the vertical,
personalized political loyalties, into horizontal ideology-based political interests, and thus the
gradual decline of clientelism as an electoral strategy (Scott 1969). The passage of time has
proved however that this prediction was largely incorrect, since later investigations showed that
clientelism persists in wide range of political systems, even in highly developed democracies
(Hicken 2011: 290).
The persistence of clientelism in various types of regimes, and thus the rebuttal of the
prediction made by first-wave researchers, motivated the second wave of research in this
field. As part of this wave of research, scholars working predominantly in the 1980s and
1990s, looked more closely into the social and institutional conditions that foster clientelistic
practices. These researchers abandoned the first-wave idea that clientelism is a characteristic
of a particular stage of socio-economic development, and started treating it as a political
strategy for mobilizing voters employed in certain institutional and social settings (see Clapham
1982; Chubb 1982; Mavrogordatos 1983; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984). For example, by
comparatively analysing the cities of Palermo and Naples, Chubb concludes that clientelistic
exchanges persisted in Palermo due to the effective management and allocation of scarce
resources by the Christian Democratic party, while this was not the case in the similar city of
Naples, where these practices were halted after 1975 (Chubb 1982). What is notable about this
second wave is that the research on clientelism moved away from anthropological single-case
studies to comparative studies conducted in the realm of political science, sociology, and
economy.
Perhaps the most influential work from this second wave of research is Shefter’s cost-benefit
theory which posits that a political party’s decision to implement clientelistic strategies to
mobilize voters is a function of voters’ demands for particularistic benefits; the availability
of resources which could be distributed in exchange for voter support; and the anticipated
reaction of party activists and elite supporters to such strategies (Shefter 1977). Thus, Shefter
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sees clientelism as the product of supply and demand forces. In his work, he takes a historical
perspective, and puts the emphasis on the importance of the supply side. He argues that the
appearance and persistence of clientelism can be traced back to the unfolding of two historical
events: the formation of the administrative system, and the beginnings of democratic mass
mobilization. According to Shefter, the existence of clientelistic relations is path-dependent,
and determined by whether voters were offered clientelistic goods by political parties when they
were first mobilized (Shefter 1994: 22-29). He then makes a distinction between ”externally”
and ”internally” mobilized political parties, depending on whether they were formed by
politicians who occupied leadership positions or not, in the current regime (Shefter 1994: 5).
The possibility to pursue a clientelistic vote-maximizing strategy, he argues, was only available
to the internally mobilized political parties, since they were the ones in control of the state
resources at the time of mass mobilization.
The third and current wave of research on clientelism builds on the theoretical foundations
of the first and second wave of research, and strives to provide more refined, nuanced, and
generalizable explanations regarding the causes and consequences of clientelistic practices.
Thus this third wave of research does not present a break from the previous waves, but an
effort to structure and advance the field of inquiry. The scholarly research conducted in this
third wave of research has been conducted by focusing on several themes, which I will briefly
review in the remainder of this section.
The primary motivations for studying clientelisim as a phenomenon are its perceived
inefficiency, negative effects on economic development, as well as its divergence from the ideal
of fair democratic representation of interests. As Fox argues, the participation in clientelistic
exchanges represents a renouncement of the political right of associational autonomy for
many poor citizens. Their economically disadvantaged position makes them dependent on
the distributive schemes offered by patrons, which can be accessed only through offering
their vote in exchange (Fox 1994: 153). Furthermore, clientelism reverses the direction
of accountability, so instead of citizens holding politicians accountable for their work in
office, politicians are monitoring the manner in which the citizens to whom they have offered
particularized benefits vote (Stokes 2005; Lyne 2007). In addition, clientelism is found to
8
pervert the electoral processes, by giving incumbent parties unfair advantage (Epstein 2009),
affecting party behaviour in the legislative arena (Desposato 2007), and influencing the size,
composition, and dynamics of government coalitions (Indridason 2005).
Clientelism as a vote-maximizing strategy presupposes the existence of elections, and with
that, the existence of multiple parties that would strive to maximize their vote share, and get
into office. Thus, electoral competitiveness has naturally arose as a major theme in the study of
clientelism. However, scholars are divided on what the effects of strong party competition are
on the likelihood of parties to pursue clientelistic vote-maximizing strategies. While one group
of scholars argue that robust competition negatively affects the resort to clientelistic practices
(see Geddes 1991; Grzymala-Busse 2007; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007a), others argue for
the exact opposite (see Levitsky 2007; Lindberg and Morrison 2008). Which outcome is to be
expected, will likely be determined by contextual factors.
Since it has been recognized that clientelistic practices exist in various types of regimes,
one strand of the third wave scholars have been engaged in studying the different forms
that clientelism takes, as well as the different functions it performs depending on the type
of the political regime. For example, in authoritarian Singapore in the 1980s, clientelism
took the form of control over basic human necessities like housing, and thus has had the
function of creating socio-economic dependencies of the clients on their patrons (Tremewan
1996). In sub-Saharan Africa, which is characterized by poorer countries that have weaker
state structures, clientelism takes a more symbolic form, through an elite form of clientelism
known as prebendalism (Walle 2007). In contrast, in middle-income countries with substantive
electoral experience, clientelism has a redistributive function primarily through the allocation
of public-sector jobs (Walle 2007). In democratic regimes, clientelism has the function of
creating a network of loyal supporters (Hicken 2011), usually taking the form of complex
broker networks through which goods and services are distributed in exchange for electoral
loyalty (see Stokes et al. 2013; Gherghina and Volintiru 2015).
The scholarly work developed in the second wave of research on clientelism has served
as the basis for further theoretical and empirical advancement made by third-wave scholars.
Most notably, Shefter’s supply and demand theory has been taken up and further developed
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by several researchers, as exemplified by the work presented in Piattoni’s influential edited
volume: Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation. This book contains a number
of comparative and single case studies which trace the roots of clientelism in the historical
evolution of institutional and structural factors in a number of Western European countries
(Piattoni 2001). While the authors of this book look at both the supply and demand side of
clientelism, they also stress the importance of one additional factor, and that is individual choice
(Piattoni 2001: 18). In particular, clientelism is treated as a strategy employed by patrons on the
one hand, to obtain and maintain political power, and clients on the other hand, to protect and
promote their interests (Piattoni 2001: 2). Whether clientelism is a viable strategy for achieving
patrons’ and clients’ goals, as these authors argue, is determined by the particular historical and
institutional circumstances of the country in question (Piattoni 2001: 2). However, whether this
strategy will be employed, and whether the circumstances making it a viable strategy will stay
in place, is determined to a great extent by the purposeful actions and choices of individual
and collective actors (Piattoni 2001: 24). Thus, in contrast to Shefter’s path-dependent and
deterministic view, these authors approach clientelism as a much more dynamic phenomenon.
The first wave of research on clientelism has also inspired a number of scholars who have
explored the connection between development and clientelism in much depth in recent years.
The relationship between economic development and clientelistic strategies has been found to
be strongly negative (see for example Remmer 2007; Bustikova and Cordeanu-Huci 2009),
and clientelism has been found to contribute to the persistence of poverty (Gersbach and Mu¨he
2011). Thus, not surprisingly, clientelism is found to be more effective as a vote-maximizing
strategy among poorer voters (Brusco et al. 2004). Much scholarly effort has been put into
discerning the mechanisms though which economic development affects the propensity of
usage of clientelistic vote-maximizing strategies. One strand of literature emphasizes the
client’s evaluation of the value of the received goods and benefits (see for example Dixit and
Londregan 1996; Calvo and Murillo 2004), while another emphasizes the ability of the patrons
to offer goods and benefits to prospective clients, both in terms of resource availability, but
also in terms of changing societal relations (see for example Desposato 2007; Kitschelt and
Wilkinson 2007b; Wilkinson 2007; Hicken 2011; Robinson and Verdier 2013).
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The most influential recent work exploring the relationship between development and
clientelism is the edited volume by Kitschelt and Wilkinson (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007b).
The contributors of this volume stress the importance of the interplay between economic
development and a number of characteristics of democratic polities for the development
and persistence of clientelistic exchanges (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007b: 6). They argue
that the competitiveness of democratic elections, political-economic governance structures
and property rights regimes, as well as ethnocultural divides are the characteristics of
democratic polities that play the most important role in shaping clientelistic relations (Kitschelt
and Wilkinson 2007b: 7). These characteristics of democratic polities actively shape
principal-agent relations, and thus accountability mechanisms (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007b:
7). In particular, Kitschelt and Wilkinson argue that increasing competitiveness of democratic
elections will translate into increased efforts to build clientelistic networks in conditions of
low socio-economic development, and into increased efforts in promoting and implementing
of programmatic goals in conditions of high socio-economic development (Kitschelt and
Wilkinson 2007b: 30). The politicization of economic governance structures depresses
socio-economic development and political competitiveness, and thus leads to the strengthening
of clientelistic relations (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007b: 40). Finally, the impact of
ethnocultural divides on citizen-politician linkages is highly dependent on the three previous
factors: development, political-economic governance structures, and political competitiveness.
In particular, in conditions of high economic development, politicized economic governance
structures, and high political competition, ethnocultural divides are more likely to be mobilized
in clientelistic principal-agent relations (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007b: 46).
Although the third wave of research has brought diversification in the methods and
approaches taken in the study of clientelism, the bulk of empirical studies have remained
either small or medium N investigations. Large-N comparative investigations remain scarce,
most likely due to the lack of comparable data on clientelism across countries and political
parties. In fact, the only dataset that contains internationally comparable data on political
parties’ usage of clientelistic practices in 88 countries across the globe is the expert survey
conducted as part of the Democratic Accountability Linkages Project (Kitschelt 2014). Thus,
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the majority of large-N research projects studying clientelistic practices come as a direct result
of the publishing of this dataset. This study aims to enrich this small pool of large-N studies
on clientelism, by testing a number of new and existing theoretical claims. The theoretical
approach taken in this study is presented in the following section.
Framework for analysis
Defining clientelism
Clientelism, like many concepts in political science, is surrounded by some ambiguity.
Scholars often use the terms clientelism, patronage, vote-buying, and even corruption
interchangeably, and thus create confusion over the exact meaning of the term. There is a lack
of agreement among scholars regarding what constitutes the exact definition of clientelism,
however, as Hicken points out, there are several reoccurring elements in the majority of the
definitions of the concept. In particular, clientelistic relationships are: dyadic, contingent,
hierarchical, and iterated (Hicken 2011: 290). Thus, given these four elements, clientelism can
be defined as a mutually beneficial exchange of resources between actors of unequal status.
However, clientelism is a dynamic phenomenon that adapts to the changes in society, and thus
several scholars argue that some of these four elements are outdated and in need of revision
in order to accurately describe the contemporary phenomenon of clientelism. In particular,
while the dyadic, face-to-face relationship between the patron and the client is still recognized
as an important element of clientelism, a number of authors stress the importance of brokers
and networks as an alternative mechanism through which the clientelistic relationships are
established and maintained (see for example Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007b: 8; Stokes 2007;
Muno 2010: 5). In addition, the element of hierarchy in the clientelistic relationship is often
left out from the contemporary definitions of the concept. While historically it was conceived
that the patron was the one that controlled the behaviour of the client by using his superior
power, status, and resources, recently scholars have pointed out that the direction of control
can be seen as operating in the other direction as well (see Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007b:
7). Thus, stating that the clientelistic relationship is strictly hierarchical, with patrons enjoying
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higher status than the clients is overly simplistic and does not grasp the entirety of the power
relations that exists in a clientelistic relationship.
In the political realm, clientelism denotes the selective use of public resources by politicians
and political parties, with the goal of securing citizens’ votes. Since this minimal definition gets
at the core of clientelistic relations, this is the definition of clientelism I adopt in the present
study. The concept of clientelism, as outlined here, is certainly close, but yet different from the
related concepts of patronage, vote-buying, and corruption. In particular, I consider patronage
to be one form of clientelism, and to denote the selective provision of public sector jobs in
exchange for electoral support (Stokes 2007: 607). Similarly, vote-buying is the provision of
gifts and small amounts of cash in exchange for electoral support (Stokes 2007: 607), and
by the same token, can be considered as a form of clientelism just like patronage. Finally,
corruption is a much broader concept, and denotes the misuse of power or public office for
private gain (TI 2009: 14). Clientelistic practices would certainly fall under the umbrella of the
broad concept of corruption, however, many other phenomena would as well. One example of
such phenomena is campaign corruption, where the flow of money and services is the reverse
of the one in clientelism: here private actors provide money and services to politicians and
political parties, in exchange for favourable legislation and other favours (Stokes 2007). Thus,
the concept of clientelism as defined here refers to only a limited set of practices, and thus
provides analytical clarity and represents a good tool for the analysis in this research project.
Resource-centred approach to the study of clientelism
The idea that resource availability of political parties has an effect on their likelihood
to engage in clientelistic practices is hardly new. Many scholars have examined this idea
theoretically and empirically, primarily within the supply and demand approach to clientelism
(Shefter 1977; Shefter 1994; Piattoni 2001). Resource availability is closely related to the
supply side within this supply and demand approach: in order for political parties to be able
to establish clientelistic relationships with their prospective voters, they need to have at their
disposal certain resources that they could potentially offer to citizens in exchange for their
votes. However, the supply approach to clientelism is exclusively concerned with political
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parties’ availability of resources that can be used specifically for the goal of establishing
a clientelistic voter-base (Shefter 1977; Shefter 1994). I propose an approach that looks
more broadly at the resources available to political parties to mobilize voters, the constrains
political parties face with regards how they can use the resources at their disposal, and political
parties’ selected vote-mobilizing strategy as a result of the former two conditions: clientelistic
as opposed to programmatic. The details of the resource-centred approach to the study of
clientelism are elaborated in the remainder of this section.
Scholars working within the supply and demand approach to clientelism have focused on
political parties’ control over the bureaucracy as a crucial resource to be used in clientelistic
exchanges (Shefter 1977; Shefter 1994; Mu¨ller 2007). Control over the bureaucracy
allows for selective distribution of government contracts, and public sector jobs, as well as
granting preferential access to social security benefits, and selective application of regulatory
rules. Thus, control over the working of the bureaucracy provides political parties with the
opportunity to mobilize voters using several different clientelistic exchanges. However, there
is one other basic type of resource that political parties have at their disposal which has not
been taken in consideration in the existing scholarly work, and that is their financial resources.
Financial resources can also be used in clientelistic exchanges, through the provision of gifts
and small amounts of cash to citizens in exchange for their votes. However, financial resources,
as well as control over the bureaucracy can be used for programmatic goals as well. Instead
of mobilizing individual, or small groups of voters on the basis of quid-pro-quo exchanges,
political parties can use these same resources to advance and promote their programmatic
goals, and thus attract a wider voter base. Whether political parties will adopt the clientelistic
or programmatic strategy to maximize their vote-share, as I will argue, depends not only on the
availability of these two types of resources, but also on the institutional and structural factors
that constrain their usage in clientelistic exchanges.
Including political parties’ financial resources in the analysis of clientelism seems more
relevant now then ever. In particular, in the past few decades, both political parties, and
the regulation of their financial resources have undergone significant changes, which in turn
has affected the source, amount, and control of their finances. On the one hand, the global
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trend of declining political party membership has transformed them from mass to cartel parties
(Katz and Mair 1995). This trend has negatively affected political parties’ already quite low
revenues from membership fees. On the other hand, since the 1950s there has been a trend
of introducing political party finance regulation, often including provisions for public funding
(Be´rtoa et al. 2014: 357). This has in turn provided a new source of revenue for political parties,
and for many of them it has become the most important financial revenue. As a result of these
two trends, political parties’ links to the society have weakened, while the links to the state
have strengthened (Van Biezen and Kopecky` 2007; Van Biezen and Kopecky` 2014). Thus,
while parties have become more heavily dependent on the state for their resources, and more
closely supervised and controlled in their usage by state institutions, they have gained resource
independence from the society, which allows them to go beyond quid-pro-quo exchanges to
form their voter-base, and push and promote their programmatic goals.
As it was mentioned in the beginning of this section, the two central resources that are
available to political parties are control of the bureaucracy, and financial means. In what
follows, I discuss the availability of these two types of resources, the institutional and structural
constrains to their usage, and the vote-mobilizing strategy likely to be adopted by political
parties as a result of the former two groups of factors.
Non-financial resources: control of the bureaucracy
In order to allocate public sector jobs, social security benefits, government contracts, and
to selectively apply regulatory rules in exchange for votes, the political party in question
has to be in control over at least some elements of the decision-making of the national and
local bureaucracy. This control is achieved through the effective presence of party affiliates
at different levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy. This phenomenon of recruitment of public
servants in the bureaucracy on the basis of political, as opposed to merit-based criteria is known
in the literature as bureaucratic politicization (Peters, Pierre, et al. 2004: 2).
The primary beneficiaries of the politicized bureaucracy are obviously the incumbent
political parties. From their position of political power, they are able to introduce their party
affiliates to various positions in the bureaucratic hierarchy, and thus gain control over various
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aspects of its work. The longer the party is in power, the more opportunities it will have to
bring its own affiliates in the bureaucracy, and thus to strengthen its control over it. Therefore,
the longer the incumbency, the more chances the party will have to use the resources of
the bureaucracy for clientelistic goals, and the better the prospect for building long-lasting
clientelistic networks.
Although political parties in government hold an advantageous position when it comes to
establishing control over the bureaucracy, parties with a long history of incumbency might
exercise some control over it even when they are out of government. In particular, taking over
the control of the politicized bureaucracy rarely occurs instantaneously. Inserting incumbent
party affiliates in various civil servant positions, replacing the civil servants affiliated to political
rivals, and establishing its political dominance in the bureaucratic agency takes time. In the
meanwhile, former long-term incumbents might use the resources of the bureaucracy for their
own clientelistc goals.
However, an explicit legal ban on using public resources for narrow party goals, as well
as the existence of strict sanctions in relation to violations of these legal bans might limit the
party’s willingness to engage in illegal activities, and thus to use the resources provided by
the bureaucracy in clientelistic exchanges. Having their reputation on the line, as well as the
possibility of facing financial or prison fines might make the political party reluctant to take
part in risky clientelistic exchanges. Therefore, the following hypotheses are deduced:
H1: The more politicized the bureaucracy is, the greater its usage for the purposes of
clientelistic exchanges by political parties.
H2: Incumbent political parties are more likely to use their control over the politicized
bureaucracy for the purposes of clientelistic exchanges than parties in the opposition.
H3: The longer the party incumbency, the greater the use of the politicized bureaucracy in
clientelistic exchanges.
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H4: The presence of legal bans on the usage of state resources for political parties’
interests is related to lower usage of the politicized bureaucracy for clientelistic mobilization
than where such bans are not present.
As evident from these four hypotheses outlined above, politicization of the bureaucracy is
a necessary condition for the establishment and maintenance of several types of clientelistic
exchanges, such as those involving selective allocation of government contracts and
social security benefits, public sector employment, and biased interpretation of regulatory
proceedings. The remaining factors discussed in hypotheses H2, H3 and H4 present conditions
that facilitate or constrain the usage of the politicized bureaucracy for clientelistic purposes,
and they are treated as such in the analysis presented in this study.
Financial resources: political party funding
Control of the bureaucracy by political parties covers only the non-financial resources
parties have at their disposal for mobilizing voters. However, parties also possess financial
resources which can be used for campaigning, daily expenses, research and program
development, but can also be used to offer gifts and small amounts of cash to prospective
voters. Thus, political parties can use their financial resources to pursue both programmatic
and clientelistic vote-maximizing strategies. These finances can come from several sources,
in particular, from membership fees, donations, public subsidies, as well as from interest and
rents. As I will argue below, whether parties will decide to use their financial resources in
programmatic or clientelistic vote-maximizing strategies will be influenced by the sources,
amounts, and control of these resources.
In particular, the provision of state subsidies might be perceived by political parties as
an opportunity to expand or strengthen their existing clientelistic vote-maximizing operations,
since they have received new resources that can be used for that purpose. I expect that this
would be the case for parties for which the amount of received subsidies is relatively low, both
in relation to their overall financial resources, and in terms of the actual purchasing power of
the received finances. Specifically, if the amount of received subsidies is a relatively small
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proportion of the total available finances, then the party in question will have little motivation
to reconsider its vote-maximizing strategies as a result of this reform. Furthermore, if the
real value of the subsidies is relatively low, the party might consider it insufficient to allow
for effective development and promotion of programmatic goals, and thus might opt to use
these resources to secure votes through offering citizens gifts and cash. In contrast, the higher
amount of state subsidies, the better the opportunities for the party to promote its programmatic
goals, and thus attract a wider voter base, rather than resorting to clientelistic practices. Thus,
in essence, I expect that the provision of state subsidies will have a negative effect on the
likelihood of political parties to engage in clientelistic practices, the higher the proportion of
subsidies from their total revenue, and the higher the value of the subsidies.
The above expectations are expressed under the assumption that the political party in
question does not face any restrictions when it comes to deciding how to use its available
financial resources. However, in reality, this is rarely the case. In particular, the introduction of
public subsidies has often been accompanied with legal obligations for financial transparency,
as well as sanctions for not complying with the transparency demands and other financial
manipulations. The prospect of facing financial and prison penalties might make the parties
reluctant to use their financial resources in clientelistic exchanges, regardless of the amount of
subsidies received. Thus, the following hypotheses can be deduced:
H5: The higher the proportion of political parties’ finances originating from state
subsidies, the lower the likelihood that the political party will use clientelistic exchanges as a
vote-maximizing strategy.
H6: The higher the real value of the political parties’ finances originating from state
subsidies, the lower the likelihood that the political party will use clientelistic exchanges as a
vote-maximizing strategy.
H7: The presence of extensive financial oversight, as well as strict sanctions for misuse
of political finances will decrease the likelihood that the political party will use clientelistic
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exchanges as a vote-maximizing strategy than where such oversight and sanctions are not
present.
Several additional factors can have an important effect on the likelihood of a party to use
clientelistic exchanges as a vote-maximizing strategy. In particular, the economic development
of the country determines the ”price” of the individual voters1. Clientelism is a reasonable
strategy for mobilizing voters only if the ”price” of the voters is relatively low (Brusco et al.
2004). If parties need to spend a considerable amount of resources in obtaining a single vote,
then it is more reasonable for them to invest their resources in the achievement of programmatic
goals, which could potentially attract more votes. Thus, the lower the economic development
of the country, the greater the likelihood that political parties will engage in clientelistic
exchanges. In addition, the usage of clientelistic exchanges as a vote-maximizing strategy
is path-dependent: since clientelistic exchanges create durable social relations, their existence
in the past is likely to continue in the present. Therefore, in the following analysis I include
past clientelistic practices as a control variable which I expect will increase the likelihood that
clientelistic practices are used.
Data and methods
In order to answer the research question guiding this study, this project relies on a large-N
analysis. In particular, a multilevel modelling technique is employed, using data for 88
countries and 506 political parties from several different sources, including original data
collected for the purposes of this study. The analysis includes both party, and country level
factors, which makes the multilevel modeling technique adequate. The analysis is performed
using the software for statistical analysis R.
In this study I employ five dependent variables derived from the Democratic Accountability
Linkages Project dataset (Kitschelt 2014) which indicate five different types of clientelistic
1Evidently, the democratic development of the country and its respect for the rule of law play are an important
factor in parties’ decision to engage in clientelistic exchanges, especially when there is a specific legal ban for
such practices. However, these variables are not included in the analysis due to their high correlation with
economic development, which causes a threat of multicollinearity in the statistical models. Economic development
is maintained due to its central role in much of the first and third wave of scientific research on clientelism.
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exchanges. The rationale behind the inclusion of five separate indicators of clientelism,
instead of one aggregate, is that in this way we can obtain a more nuanced picture about the
types of clientelistic exchanges political parties engage in, and the factors that facilitate this
type of political behavior. As I argue in my theoretical section, and as many authors point
out (for example Tremewan 1996; Walle 2007; Stokes et al. 2013; Gherghina and Volintiru
2015), different types of clientelistic exchanges may thrive under different conditions. Thus,
considering the specific nature that different forms clientelism take would provide us with a
better understanding of the general phenomenon. The full list of dependent variables included
in this study, together with their brief description is provided in Table 1.
Following the theoretical section of this study, the independent variables reflect political
parties’ availability of financial and non-financial resources, as well as the structural and
institutional constraints for their usage in clientelistic exchanges. Control of the bureaucracy
is identified as the most important non-financial resource that political parties can use to
offer citizens and companies clientelistic goods and services. This variable is operationalized
using the index of public administration professionalism from the Quality of Government
expert survey (Teorell et al. 2011). This index reflects the degree to which the bureaucracy
is professionalized or politicized.
The second type of resource that political parties can employ in clientelistic exchanges is
money. The information regarding the financial resources that political parties have at their
disposal has been collected independently by the author for the purposes of this project. This
information is retrieved from the official financial statements issued by political parties or
national authorities responsible for monitoring political parties’ finances. These documents
have served as an information source for the annual political parties’ revenues originating from
state subsidies, as well as their total annual revenues. This data has served as the basis for
construction of two variables. The first variable represents the proportion of revenue originating
from state subsidies from the total revenue, obtained by calculating the ratio of revenues
originating from subsidies and total revenue. The second variable represents an estimate of
the real value of the revenues originating from state subsidies. In order to make the finance
data cross-nationally comparable, I divided the received subsidies by the average daily salary
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Table 1: Description of the dependent variables
Variable Description Source
Clientelism -
Preferential public
benefits
Whether candidates and parties give or promise
to give citizens preferential access to material
advantages in public social policy schemes (e.g.,
preferential access to subsidized prescription drugs,
public scholarships, public housing, better police
protection etc.) as inducement to obtain their votes.
Continuous: 1 - low; 4 - high.
DALP
Clientelism -
Employment
opportunities
Whether candidates or parties give or promise to
give citizens preferential access to employment
in the public sector or in the publicly regulated
private sector (e.g., post office, janitorial services,
maintenance work, jobs at various skill levels in
state owned enterprises or in large private enterprises
with government contracts and subsidies, etc.) as
inducement to obtain their vote. Continuous: 1 - low;
4 - high.
DALP
Clientelism -
Government contracts
Whether candidates or parties give or promise to
give citizens and businesses preferential access to
government contracts or procurement opportunities
(e.g., public works/construction projects, military
procurement projects without competitive bidding
to companies whose employees support the
awarding party) as inducement to gain their and their
employees votes. Continuous: 1 - low; 4 - high.
DALP
Clientelism
- Regulatory
proceedings
Whether candidates or parties influence or promise
to influence the application of regulatory rules
issued by government agencies (e.g., more lenient
tax assessments and audits, more favourable
interpretation of import and export regulation, less
strict interpretation of fire and escape facilities in
buildings, etc.) in order to favor individual citizens
or specific businesses as inducement to gain their
and their employees vote. Continuous: 1 - low; 4 -
high.
DALP
Clientelism - Gifts
provision
Whether candidates and parties give or promise to
give citizens consumer goods (e.g., food or liquor,
clothes, cookware, appliances, medicines, building
materials etc.) as inducement to obtain their votes.
Continuous: 1 - low; 4 - high.
DALP
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in the given year. Then I divided the obtained amount by the size of the party electorate,
using the number of voters the political party has mobilized in the then most recent legislative
elections. Thus, I obtained a cross-nationally comparable value that indicates the amount of
financial resources political parties can spend annually to mobilize a single voter, expressed as
the number of the national average daily salaries per party’s voter.
The remaining independent variables correspond to the institutional and structural factors
that constrain or enable political parties to use their available resources in clientelistic
exchanges. Among these are the legal provisions regulating the use of financial and
non-financial resources by political parties, for which data was obtained from the International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) database (Ohman 2012),
as well as Money Politics and Transparency (Money Politics and Transparency). The data
derived from these two sources was recoded where necessary to match the time period covered
in the analysis. Furthermore, in this group of variables, the status of the political party as
an incumbent or challenger, as well as years spent in government in the past 20 years for
each political party are also included. Finally, clientelistic historical experience, as well as the
economic development of the country. The full list of independent variables with their source
and description is provided in Table 2.
The temporal and geographical scope of the analysis is limited by data availability. In
particular, since the expert surveys used to construct the Democratic Accountability Linkages
Project dataset (Kitschelt 2014) were conducted in late 2008 and beginning of 2009, the
temporal scope of the analysis is limited to this time point. While the temporal scope of
the analysis is limited to only one point, the analysis has a wide geographical coverage.
Specifically, data for 506 political parties from 88 countries has been collected and used in
the analysis.
Analysis and results
This section presents the results of the conducted analysis. The results are organized in two
subsections, corresponding to the two types of resources available to political parties discussed
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Table 2: Description of the independent variables
Variable Description Source
Party level variables
Subsidies as proportion
of total revenue
The proportion of political party’s total
revenue originating from state subsidies.
Average value of three consecutive years.
Author’s calculations
using data from
political parties’
financial statements
Real value of subsidies The value of the party’s received
subsidies, divided by the average
national daily salary and by the size of
the party’s electorate (as estimated from
the nearest elections). Average value of
three consecutive years.
Author’s calculations
using data from
political parties’
financial statements,
election results, and
ILO databases
Incumbent party Whether the party is part of the national
government at the time of analysis
(dummy).
Author’s coding
Duration of
incumbency
The total amount of years the party had
been part of the national government in
the preceding 20 years.
Author’s coding
Country level variables
Bureaucratic
professionalization
The degree to which the bureaucracy
is politicized. Continuous: lower
values - politicized; higher values -
professionalized
QoG expert survey
Public funding Legal provision for direct public funding
(dummy)
IDEA and MPT
Vote buying ban Legal ban on obtaining votes for
exchange of gifts and cash (dummy).
IDEA and MPT
Regular reporting on
finances
Legal obligation for political parties
to report on their finances in regular
intervals (dummy).
IDEA and MPT
Transparency of
finances
Legal obligation for political parties to
make their financial reports available to
the public (dummy).
IDEA and MPT
Legal ban on usage
of public resources
for political parties’
interests
Legal ban on the use of state resources
for political party interests.
IDEA and MPT
Sanctions Sanctions imposed by law in the case of
political finance violations (dummy).
IDEA and MPT
Economic development Logged GDP per capita (continuous). World Bank
development indicators
Past clientelism National score denoting the level of
clientelism 10 years prior. Continuous:
1 - low; 4 - high.
DALP and author’s
calculations
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in this study. Thus, the first subsection presents the models that analyze the relationship
between non-financial resource availability and the likelihood of parties to use this type of
resources in clientelistic exchanges, while the second subsection presents the models that
analyze the relationship between availability of financial resources and use of clientelistic
vote-maximizing strategies involving the provision of gifts and cash. All presented models
are multilevel mixed-effects models, fitted using the software for statistical analysis R, and
incorporate data both of party and country level indicators.
Non-financial resources and clientelistic exchanges
The central non-financial resource that political parties can potentially use in clientelistic
exchanges, as specified in the theoretical section, is their control over the bureaucracy. In
particular, through their control of the politicized bureaucracy, political parties can offer
potential voters preferential access to public benefits, employment in the public sector,
preferential access to government contracts, as well as preferential treatment when it comes
to the implementation of regulatory rules. In order to estimate likelihood of parties engaging in
clientelistic exchanges which involve one of these four listed non-financial goods and services,
given several structural and institutional factors, I have fitted eight multilevel models which are
presented in Table 3.
Before fitting the multilevel models, I tested the adequacy of the chosen method of modeling
by calculating the interclass correlation coefficient for each of the four types of clientelistic
exchanges. The interclass correlation coefficient amounts to 0.54 for the public benefits models,
0.69 for the public sector employment models, 0.61 for the government contract models, and
0.55 for the regulatory proceedings models. These coefficients indicate that 54%, 69%, 61%,
and 55% of the variation in the four dependent variables respectively is accounted by the
clustering of the political parties into countries, which is a strong indicator that multilevel
modeling is an appropriate method for modeling the data. These percentages also indicate that
country level predictors will bear greater weight than party level predictors in explaining the
likelihood of parties engaging in these four types of clientelistic exchanges.
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For each of the four clientelistic exchanges discussed here, two multilevel models were
fitted. What differentiates these modes is the incumbency variable included: one set of models
include only the variable denoting present incumbents, while the other set includes only the
variable representing total duration of incumbency in the period of the past twenty years. The
reason behind this decision to construct two separate models for each of the four types of
clientelistic exchange is the conceptual overlap between the two variables, as well as their
relatively high correlation coefficient (r=0.6), which causes a threat of multicollinearity.
As is evident from the results presented in Table 3, bureaucratic professionalization is
related to lower usage of all four types of clientelistic exchanges. The coefficient of this
variable is in the predicted direction in all eight models, however, it does not reach statistical
significance in the two models that estimate the likelihood for political parties to engage in
clientelistic exchanges involving the provision of preferential access to public benefits. Thus,
the more politicized the bureaucracy is, the more likely it is that parties will use employment
opportunities, government contracts, and regulatory proceedings as goods in clientelistic
exchanges. This finding provides general support for my first hypothesis.
Being the current incumbent, and having been an incumbent for longer period of time
during the past two decades are also consistently related to a higher reliance on these four types
of clientelistic exchanges as a vote-maximizing strategy. This is shown by the positive sign and
statistical significance of the coefficients of the variables incumbency and incumbency duration.
The presence of a specific legal ban on the usage of state resources for the advancement of
interests of political parties has a limited effect on preventing clientelistic exchanges. While
in all models except the ones predicting the use of preferential public benefits allocation as a
clientelistic tool, the direction of the coefficient of this variable is in the predicted direction, in
none of the models this coefficient reaches statistical significance.
What is of particular interest for this study is the conditional effect of these factors, or
in other words, their joint effect on the outcome of clientelism. The conditional effects are
captured by the interaction effects included in the models. As presented in Table 3, the
joint effect of incumbency and bureaucratic professionalization is negative and statistically
significant in the models involving preferential allocation of public benefits, and providing
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employment opportunities as goods in a clientelistic exchange. This is an indication that the
effect of bureaucratic professionalization on these two types of clientelism is different for
incumbents and opposition parties, and that the effect of bureaucratic professionalization on
clientelism is reduced when it comes to incumbents. The effect can be better observed visually
in the plots provided in Figure 1.
(a) Public benefits
(b) Employment opportunities
Figure 1: Interaction effects between bureaucratic professionalization and incumbency
As plot (a) in Figure 1 shows, the usage of public benefits as clientelistic goods by
opposition parties is low to begin with, thus the professionalization of the bureaucracy does
not make a very big difference. In contrast, incumbent parties resort to this type of clientelism
to a greater extent when they operate in a system where the bureaucracy is highly politicized,
and they do so less when the bureaucracy is professionalized. The situation is quite similar
for the usage of employment opportunities as goods in clientelistic exchanges, as presented in
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plot (b) in Figure 1. In particular, the only difference here is that the effect of bureaucratic
professionalization on the likelihood to use the provision of employment opportunities as a
clientelistic strategy is similar for both incumbent and opposition parties, despite the lower
usage of this strategy by opposition parties.
With regards to the third hypothesis outlined in the theoretical section, the interaction effect
between bureaucratic professionalization and incumbency duration is negative and statistically
significant in all reported models in Table 3. This implies that the more professionalized
the bureaucracy is, the smaller the effect of incumbency duration on the likelihood to use
clientelistic strategies by political parties is likely to be. This effect is illustrated in Figure
2, for the case of regulatory proceedings. This effect is very similar for the other three types
of clientelistic exchanges, so I chose to display only one for the sake of brevity. The plots
representing all of the remaining interaction effects included in the eight models presented in
Table 3 are provided in the Appendix.
Figure 2: Interaction effects between bureaucratic professionalization and incumbency duration
for regulatory proceedings
Whether there are any legal restrictions on the usage of public resources for political
parties’ goals does not make a difference to the effect of bureaucratic professionalization
on the likelihood to use clientelistic vote-maximizing strategies, as shown by the small and
insignificant interaction effects between bureaucratic professionalization and legal restrictions
in Table 3. These coefficients, together with the coefficients of the individual effect of legal
restrictions on the likelihood to resort to clientelistic vote-maximizing strategies, show that
legal restrictions have a negligible effect when it comes to changing the likelihood for political
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parties to engage in clientelistic activities. Thus, while these results provide strong support for
the first three hypotheses outlined in the theoretical framework, there is no empirical support
for my fourth hypothesis.
Finally, it should be noted that, preferential access to public benefits, employment
opportunities, preferential access to government contracts, and the selective application of
regulatory rules are all more likely to be used in clientelistic exchanges in countries with
lover economic development, and in countries with a clientelistic past. The negative sign and
statistical significance of the variable GDP per capita, as well as the positive and statistically
significant coefficient for the past clientelism variable, provide support for these claims.
In sum, these results suggest that structural factors have a consistent effect on the likelihood
of parties to use the politicized bureaucracy as a resource in clientelistic exchanges, as provided
by the consistently negative and statistically significant effect of economic development,
expressed by the GDP per capita variable. However, institutional factors have a limited effect
in preventing this type of clientelisic behavior, since the legal ban on using state resources
for political party’s narrow interests does not discourage parties from using state resources as
clientelistic goods. In effect, what seems to matter the most for the likelihood of parties to
use the bureaucracy as a resource in clientelisic exchanges in conditions of high bureaucratic
politicization, is their incumbency status. The next subsection looks at the factors that influence
the likelihood of political parties to use their financial resources in clientelistic exchanges.
Financial resources and clientelistic exchanges
All political parties have at their disposal a certain amount of financial resources that they
can use as a resource in their vote-maximizing strategies. These financial resources can be
used both in clientelistic exchanges as gifts and small amounts of cash offered in exchange for
citizens’ votes, or they can be used for promotional and program development purposes, which
would help parties to attract voters on the basis of their programmatic goals. In the theoretical
section I presented an argument which specifies that the parties’ choice of vote-maximizing
strategy: clientelistic or programmatic, will be influenced by amount, source and control of
these financial resources. I this section I present a statistical test to that argument, using a
29
multilevel modeling technique.
As in the case of models related to non-financial resources, in order to test the adequacy of
the chosen method, I calculated the interclass correlation coefficient of the dependent variable,
which in this case is clientelistic exchanges involving the provision of gifts and money. The
coefficient amounts to 0.71, which indicates that 71% of the variance is accounted by clustering
of the political parties within countries. Since a sizeable proportion of the overall variance in
the dependent variable is accounted by country level factors, multilevel modeling seems to be
an adequate modeling technique.
Table 4 presents three multilevel models fitted on the same dependent variable: level of
clientelistic exchanges involving the provision of gifts. The difference between the three
models is in the state subsidies indicator they include. In particular, the first model includes
a variable denoting the presence or absence of direct public funding provisions in law. The
second model includes a variable denoting the party’s proportion of total revenue originating
from state subsidies, while the third model includes a variable indicating the value of the
received state subsidies, expressed as the number of average daily salaries the party has
received from state subsidies on annual basis, per voter of their own party voter base. The
remaining independent variables relate to the institutional and structural factors that might
impose restrictions on the ways parties can choose to spend their financial resources.
The first interesting finding evident from these three models in Table 4 is that while the
mere provision of public funding to political parties guaranteed in law is related to higher
usage of clientelistic vote-maximizing strategies involving the provision of gifts, while the size
of the subsidies, both as a proportion of the total party’s revenue, and in terms of their actual
value are negatively related to the usage of these types of clientelistic strategies. However,
these coefficients do not reach statistical significance, thus, it cannot be concluded with high
certainty that the direction of their effects are indeed as the results in Table 4 indicate. Thus, the
fifth and sixth hypotheses stated in the theoretical section have received only limited support
from the empirical analysis.
The results reported in the three models in Table 4 seem to paint a sceptical picture
about the effectiveness of legal measures in preventing clientelistic behavior. In particular,
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Table 4: Financial resources and clientelism mixed effect models regression estimates
Provision of gifts and cash
Public funding
in law
Subsidies as
proportion of
total revenue
Subsidies
value
Fixed effects
Intercept 5.78*** 5.18*** 4.99***
(0.53) (0.79) (0.76)
Public funding in law 0.38
(0.38)
Subsidies proportion of total -0.43
(0.80)
Subsidies value -11.28
(13.82)
Vote buying ban -0.21 -0.20 -0.15
(0.25) (0.21) (0.18)
Regular reporting on finances -0.76*** -0.67*** -0.59**
(0.26) (0.24) (0.24)
Transparency of finances -0.01 0.07 0.13
(0.25) (0.23) (0.24)
Sanctions 0.54 0.55 0.38
(0.36) (0.34) (0.34)
Incumbent 0.26*** 0.15** 0.16***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
GDP per capita (log) -0.43*** -0.37*** -0.36***
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Past clientelism 0.14* 0.19 0.24*
(0.08) (0.12) (0.12)
Subsidies * Vote buying ban 0.21 0.27 0.01
(0.29) (0.39) (0.38)
Subsidies * Regular reporting 1.08*** 5.07*** 61.21**
(0.31) (2.09) (29.74)
Subsidies * Transparency -0.06 -3.79* -56.18*
(0.29) (2.06) (29.71)
Subsidies * Sanctions -1.22*** -0.96 6.24
(0.43) (0.91) (13.87)
Variance components (SD)
Intercept 0.37 0.36 0.38
Residual 0.46 0.43 0.42
Deviance 760.20 357.50 361.60
N (Countries) 88 47 47
N (Political parties) 506 266 266
Note: Levels of statistical significance p < 0.01 ”***”; p < 0.05 ”**”; p < 0.10 ”*”
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while explicit vote-buying bans in law are negatively related to clientelistic exchanges, the
coefficients of this variable are not statistically significant. The legal obligation to disclose their
financial information with the public, as well as the prospect of facing sanctions for financial
manipulations, not only do not discourage parties to engage in clientelism, but according to
the coefficients in Table 4, are even positively related to this type of behavior. However, here
again, the coefficients do not reach statistical significance. The only legal measure that seem
to be effective in curbing clientelistic behavior is the obligation to report party’s finances to a
specified national entity.
What is of particular interest for this study is the effect of publicly provided funding to
political parties on the likelihood to engage in clientelistic exchanges, given certain constraints
to their usage. Thus, the interaction effects between publicly provided funding and particular
legal constraints to its unrestricted usage provide a more nuanced overview of the effects of
this regulatory movement in political finance. As the lack of statistical significance for the
interaction effect between publicly provided funding and vote buying ban shows, there seems to
be no difference of the effect of public funding in countries where there is a explicit vote-buying
ban and in countries where there is no such ban. In contrast, the effect of public funding on
the likelihood of parties to engage in clientelistic exchanges involving the provision of gifts is
different in countries where parties have a legal obligation to regularly report their finances,
to countries where there is no such legal obligation, as displayed by the statistically significant
interaction effect of these two factors. A visual representation of this interaction effect is helpful
for better understanding of this relationship, thus, the plots representing this effect are provided
in Figure 3.
Surprisingly enough, as the three plots in Figure 3 show, while the obligation to regularly
report on their finances decreases political parties’ likelihood to engage in clientelistic
activities when no public funding is provided, this likelihood slightly increases with the mere
introduction of public funding (plot (a)), and as the subsidies rise in terms of proportion of
parties’ total revenues (plot (b)), and in terms of their real value (plot (c)). Thus, these results
indicate that the legal obligation to regularly report on the parties’ finances is more effective as
a measure in curbing clientelistic behavior when no public funding is provided, then when such
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(a) Public funding in law and regular reporting
(b) Subsidies proportion and regular reporting
(c) Subsidies value and regular reporting
Figure 3: Interaction effects between public funding and obligation for regular reporting of
finances
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funding is provided, and when this funding represents a substantial proportion of the party’s
revenue, or it has a high real value.
The combination of public funding with legal obligations for financial transparency, as well
as with threats of sanctions for uncovered financial manipulations, seem to have an effect on
preventing clientelistic behavior, as the interaction effects between these two factors in Table 3
show. The joint effect of these factors on parties’ likelihood to engage in clientelistic exchanges
is more clearly observed through a visual inspection of the interaction plots. Thus, Figure 4
presents the interaction effects between the legal obligation to provide public access to the
parties’ finances and the state received subsidies as proportion of the total party’s revenue
(plot(a)), and with the actual value of the state received subsidies (plot(b)).
(a) Subsides proportion and transparency obligation
(b) Subsidies value and transparency obligation
Figure 4: Interaction effects between public funding and obligation for financial transparency
As can be observed from the two plots in Figure 4, as the share of the subsidies from the
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total party’s revenue increase (plot (a)), and as the value of the subsidies increase (plot (b)),
the likelihood of political parties to engage in clientelistic exchanges involving the provision of
gifts to citizens increases as well, in conditions where there is no obligation to publicly disclose
the party’s finances. However, in conditions of legal obligation for financial transparency,
the increase in the proportion of revenue coming from state subsidies, and the increase of
the value of the subsidies, are both related to lower likelihood for political parties to exert
clientelistic behavior. The interaction effect between public funding and threat of sanctions for
financial manipulations on the likelihood to engage in clientelistic exchanges is quite similar,
as observed in Figure 5. Here we can see that in conditions where no sanctions are specified
in law for financial manipulations on the part of the political parties, the mere provision of
public funding in law makes the political parties more likely to provide gifts to citizens as
an inducement to obtain their votes. However, when there is a threat of sanctions for misuse
of financial resources available to political parties, the provision of public funding does not
increase the likelihood for political parties to exert clientelistic behavior. Thus, for the seventh
and last hypothesis outlined in the theoretical section, the evidence seems rather mixed: while
certain legal measures do discourage parties from using their financial resources in clientelistic
exchanges (regular reporting when no public funding is provided, transparency obligations,
and sanctions), others seem to be inefficient towards that goal (vote-buying ban), and even
counterproductive (regular reporting when public fudning is provided).
Figure 5: Interaction effect the provision of public funding in law and threat of sanctions
In the case of clientelistic strategies involving the provision of gifts to citizens, incumbency
35
does not represent a factor that strongly conditions the availability of political parties’ resources
for such clientelistic exchanges, as it does for clientelistic exchanges that involve the use of
non-financial resources, i.e. the bureaucracy. In particular, all political parties have some
financial resources at their disposal, although the amount might differ greatly. Thus, although
incumbency was not expected to have a strong effect on the likelihood of political parties to
offer citizens gifts and cash in exchange of their votes, as the coefficients in Table 3 indicate,
here again, incumbency is a strong predicting factor for clientelistic behavior. Similarly as
in the case of clientelistic exchanges involving the use of non-financial resources, economic
development has a strong negative relationship with clientelism, while clientelistic past has a
positive one.
Overall, the results presented in this section indicate that again structural factors have a
consistent effect on the likelihood of parties to engage in clientelistic exchanges involving
the provision of gifts and cash to citizens, while the effect of institutional factors is rather
mixed. The legal requirement for regular reporting of political parties’ finances discourages
clientelistic behavior only when no public funding is provided, while the obligation for funding
disclosure, and the threat of sanctions do so only in combination with public funding. The legal
ban on vote-buying does not appear to achieve its intended purpose.
Discussion and conclusion
The goal of this study was to test the relationship between political parties’ resource
availability, the structural and institutional constraints for unrestricted usage of the available
resources, and as a result, the choice of clientelism as a vote-maximizing strategy. This
study was motivated by the relatively recent political finance regulatory movement, which
involved the introduction of public funding to political parties in a number of countries across
the globe, usually coupled with legal provisions envisaging stricter control and oversight of
political parties’ management of their resources. I argued that this regulatory movement has
changed the structure of political parties’ resources, and limited the possibilities for their use.
Thus, I argued that the inclusion of political parties’ financial resources in addition to their
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non-financial resources is a necessary step towards providing a fuller picture of the relationship
between parties’ resources and clientelistic practices in research on clientelism.
I expected that the type of resource available to political parties will be closely linked to
their resort to specific clientelistic exchanges. In particular, I expected that control over the
bureaucracy would allow parties to engage in clientelistic exchanges involving the provision
of preferential access to public benefits, employment opportunities, government contracts,
and biased interpretation of regulatory rules. In addition, I expected that the availability of
financial resources will allow parties to use gifts and cash as goods in clientelistic exchanges.
However, as I argued, the possibility of parties to use their available resources in these types of
clientelistic exchanges would be influenced by institutional and structural factors. Moreover,
I expected that political parties’ increased availability of financial resources originating from
state subsidies, accompanied with legal provisions for financial oversight and control, would
lead to their diminished reliance of clientelistic exchanges as a vote-maximizing strategy.
The results of the conducted analysis provided evidence that the usage of specific
clientelistic strategies is indeed related to the type of resources available to political parties.
Moreover, the analysis showed that structural factors, most importantly economic development,
are negatively related to the likelihood of political parties engaging in any type of clientelistic
exchange. This finding is in line with the expectations presented by scholars working in
the first and third wave of clientelism research. The results pertaining to the influence of
institutional factors, as constraints to the usage of party resources in clientelistic exchanges
however, provided somewhat mixed results. In particular, institutional constrains in the form
of vote-buying bans, and bans on the use of state resources for party interests, do not seem
to achieve their goal of preventing clientelistic behavior. However, the legal obligations for
regular reporting of party finances, as well as the obligations for public disclosure of party
finances and the threats of sanctions in combination with publicly provided funding do decrease
the likelihood of parties’ resort to clientelistic practices. Finally, the results provide some
indication that the larger the value and proportion of fund originating from state subsidies, the
less likely parties are to use these finances in clientelistic exchanges.
This study provides insights relevant both to the scholarly study of clientelism, and to public
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policy. In particular, it demonstrates the value of analyzing political party finances, as one type
of resource that they can use in vote-maximizing strategies. In addition, it provides a more
nuanced and generalizable picture regarding the effectiveness of legal measures in limiting
parties’ resort to clientelistic vote-maximizing strategies.
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Appendix
Table 5: Countries included in the analysis
Country No. parties Non-financial
resources
models
Financial
resources legal
model
Financial
resources
subsidy
models
Albania 4
Angola 3
Argentina 5
Australia 4
Austria 5
Bangladesh 4
Belgium 12
Benin 5
Bolivia 4
Botswana 3
Brazil 11
Bulgaria 7
Canada 5
Chile 6
Colombia 7
Costa Rica 4
Croatia 10
Czech Republic 5
Denmark 8
Dominican Rep. 3
Ecuador 6
Egypt 4
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El Salvador 4
Estonia 6
Finland 8
France 7
Georgia 4
Germany 7
Ghana 3
Greece 5
Guatemala 7
Honduras 2
Hungary 5
India 17
Indonesia 7
Ireland 6
Israel 9
Italy 9
Jamaica 2
Japan 5
Kenya 4
Latvia 8
Lebanon 15
Lithuania 6
Macedonia 5
Malaysia 5
Mali 5
Mauritius 6
Mexico 5
Moldova 6
Mongolia 5
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Morocco 5
Mozambique 2
Namibia 5
Netherlands 9
New Zealand 8
Nicaragua 3
Niger 4
Nigeria 3
Norway 7
Pakistan 6
Panama 6
Paraguay 7
Peru 5
Philippines 7
Poland 6
Portugal 5
South Korea 3
Romania 6
Russia 6
South Africa 3
Senegal 5
Serbia 7
Slovakia 6
Slovenia 8
Spain 5
Sweden 8
Switzerland 7
Taiwan 2
Tanzania 3
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Thailand 7
Turkey 6
UK 3
USA 2
Ukraine 6
Uruguay 3
Venezuela 6
Zambia 5
Count 506 79 88 47
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